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NOTES & COMMENTS
WYLER SUMMIT PARTNERSHIP V. TURNER
BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. AND THE
CONTRACTUAL WAIVER DOCTRINE:
TRANSFORMING THE SHIELD INTO A SWORD?*
I. INTRODUCTION
A well-established rule under California contract law is that a party to
a contract may waive a provision that was inserted in the agreement solely
for the benefit of that party.' The waiver doctrine is generally employed
where the non-waiving party has failed to comply with a minor contract
term, or where a condition precedent to the waiving party's performance
has not occurred.2 By waiving the term or condition, the party is able to
continue its performance under the contract and maintain the right to the
non-waiving party's performance. This use of the waiver doctrine is
referred to as "defensive ' a because it does not impose new legal duties on
the non-waiving party.5  Instead, defensive waiver, a long recognized
doctrine in contract law,6 is used as a shield: it enables the parties to avoid
the termination of the contract that might otherwise occur due either to a
party's non-compliance or the non-occurrence of a term.7
* Credit for inspiring the topic of this Note belongs to Mitchel Karp's article entitled
Offensive Use of the Contractual Waiver Doctrine: Does Wyler Summit v. Turner Threaten the
Stability of Entertainment Agreements?, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Summer 1998, at 11. Mr. Karp is
an attorney with Pierce, Gorman in Beverly Hills.
1. See Sabo v. Fasano, 201 Cal. Rptr. 270, 271 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing Doryon v. Salant,
142 Cal. Rptr. 378 (Ct. App. 1977)).
2. See 1 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, CONTRACTS § 768 (9th ed. 1987)
(providing common examples of waiver such as a landlord's waiver of the rent payment due date
provision by acceptance of rent).
3. See Mitchel Karp, Offensive Use of the Contractual Waiver Doctrine: Does Wyler
Summit v. Turner Threaten the Stability of Entertainment Agreements?, ENT. & SPORTS LAW.,
Summer 1998, at 11, 11.
4. See, e.g., id.
5. See id.; see also Groves v. Prickett, 420 F.2d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 1970).
6. See generally JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§
11-29 to 11-32 (3d ed. 1987) (discussing the application of the defensive waiver doctrine in case
law).
7. See Rennie & Laughlin, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 242 F.2d 208, 210 (9th Cir. 1957).
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This Note discusses how the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Wyler Summit Partnership v. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.8 effectively
approved the offensive use of the contractual waiver doctrine--a use which
had never before been allowed under California law.
In Wyler Summit, the heirs of William Wyler ("Wyler"), director of
the famous film Ben Hur,9 sought to waive the installment payment
provision in Wyler's contract with Turner Broadcasting System ("Turner"),
the original movie studio's successor in interest.' 0 Wyler's heirs ("Wyler
Summit") argued that they had the right to waive the annual payment cap
on Wyler's percentage compensation that had been specified in the
installment payment provision of the contract, and that therefore Turner
had a duty to remit the unpaid portion that had accrued under the cap."
However, the factual context of Wyler Summit is fundamentally distinct in
several ways from situations in which contractual waiver is normally
employed.' 2 The most significant distinction is that Wyler Summit used
waiver in an offensive manner,' 3 as opposed to the defensive use previously
allowed under California case law. 14 The Ninth Circuit, however, ignored
this critical difference, remanded the case and thus allowed the heirs to
proceed on their breach of contract claim arising from Turner's failure to
remit all compensation owed under the allegedly waived payment
provision.
15
This Note analyzes the Wyler Summit opinion in order to determine
whether the Ninth Circuit correctly applied California's contractual waiver
doctrine. Part 1I discusses California contract law and the rules California
courts have established regarding contractual waiver. Part III examines the
decisions of the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Wyler Summit, and argues that the Ninth Circuit majority opinion is
inconsistent with both California case law and long-standing principles
relating to the use of the contractual waiver doctrine. This part also
discusses the Wyler Summit dissenting opinion, and concludes that the
dissent analyzed the contractual waiver doctrine in a manner consistent
with precedent and general contract principles. In addition, Part III
8. 135 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 1998).
9. BEN HUR (MGM-Loew's, Inc. 1959).
10. See Wyler Summit Partnership v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 659-60 (9th
Cir. 1998).
11. See id.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See Karp, supra note 3, at 12.
14. See, e.g., Rennie & Laughlin, 242 F.2d at 210 (holding that waiver can only be
employed for defensive purposes).
15. See Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 664.
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examines the potentially negative ramifications of the Wyler Summit
decision for entertainment lawyers. Finally, Part IV suggests that the Wyler
Summit precedent could have a detrimental effect on the ability of
entertainment attorneys to draft reliable agreements on behalf of their
clients.
II. CALIFORNIA CONTRACT LAW
To understand the ramifications of the Wyler Summit decision, it is
necessary to first examine California statutory and common law relating to
contract interpretation and the contractual waiver doctrine.
A. Contract Interpretation Rules
California statutes and the cases interpreting those statutes direct
courts to adhere to an objective view of contract interpretation. 16  For
instance, the California Civil Code provides that where the language of a
contract is clear, that language must govern the contract's interpretation.
17
Similarly, the Code mandates that where written contracts are concerned,
the intention of the parties should be ascertained from the writing alone, if
practicable. 18 In other words, courts presume a contract reflects the intent
of the parties, and prefer to enforce the plain meaning of the contractual
terms where possible. 19
Further, where attached documents accompany a complaint, the
court's analysis need not be limited to the allegations contained in the
complaint.2° In fact, California cases have held that a court may look
beyond the complaint and consider attached documents even on a motion to
dismiss, 21 despite the general rule that the court must accept the non-
16. See WITKiN, supra note 2, § 684, at 617 (stating that the modem approach toward
contract interpretation is to determine the parties' intent under an objective standard).
17. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1638 (West 1985); see also General Star Indem. Co. v. Schools
Excess Liab. Fund, 888 F. Supp. 1022, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1638 for
the proposition that "[t]he written language of the contract governs if it is clear and explicit");
Shaw v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 850, 855 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
"[w]here contract language is clear and explicit and does not lead to absurd results, we ascertain
intent from the written terms and go no further" (citing Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Employers Ins., 48
Cal. Rptr. 2d 368, 373 (Ct. App. 1995)).
18. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1639.
19. See id. §§ 1638-1639.
20. See Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 625 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991); Durning v. First
Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). Attached documents can include contracts.
See, e.g., Roth, 942 F.2d at 625.
21. See Roth, 942 F.2d at 625; Durning, 815 F.2d at 1267.
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movant's allegations as true. It is well settled that if an attached
document refutes any allegations of a complaint, the court is not required to
accept those allegations as true.23
Thus, even at the pre-trial motion level, a court deciding a contract
dispute should base its analysis primarily on the contract itself.24 Where a
contract is attached to a complaint as an exhibit, and the language of the
contract differs from allegations in the complaint, the contract's language
takes precedence over the complaint.
B. The Contractual Waiver Doctrine
Contractual waiver has been defined as "an intentional abandonment
or relinquishment of a known right or advantage which, but for such
waiver, the party would have enjoyed. 26 Contractual waiver often occurs
when one party waives a minor term or condition with which the other
party is unable, or fails, to comply. 27 As a result of the waiver, the contract
remains in force and the waiving party is able to receive the benefit of the
other party's performance.28
The primary limit applied to the waiver doctrine is that the provision
waived must have been placed in the contract solely for the waiving party's
benefit.29 Thus, if a provision benefits both parties, it cannot be waived by
only one party.3 °
Common examples of waiver include: waiver of a "time is of the
essence" provision by acceptance of late payments in an installment
contract for the sale of land or goods; 31 a landlord's waiver of a rent
payment due date by the acceptance of late rent;32 and an employer's
waiver of twenty years' service requirement as the basis for an employee's
22. See Durning, 815 F.2d at 1267.
23. See Roth, 942 F.2d at 625; Wilson v. United Airlines, No. C 98-2460 MMC, 1998 WL
754602, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 1998) (noting that the court may disregard factual allegations if
they are contradicted by the facts established in documents attached as exhibits to the complaint).
24. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 1638; Roth, 942 F.2d at 625.
25. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
26. 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 678 (3d ed. 1961) (quoting Carfi v. De Martino, 46 N.Y.S.2d 134, 136 (Sup. Ct.
1944)).
27. See WITKIN, supra note 2, § 768, at 694-95 (listing common examples of waiver).
28. See Karp, supra note 3, at 11.
29. See Sabo v. Fasano, 201 Cal. Rptr. 270, 271 (Ct. App. 1984).
30. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 6, § 11-31, at 494.
31. See WITKIN, supra note 2, § 768, at 694-95.
32. See id.
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pension.33 As these examples demonstrate, the waiver doctrine generally
takes the form of one party's waiver of a condition precedent 34 to its
performance where enforcement of that condition would have an unjust or
unwanted impact on one or both parties. The undesirable impact normally
takes the form of termination or forfeiture of the contract.35
The fundamental philosophy underlying the contractual waiver
doctrine is that courts favor the enforcement of contracts.36 Thus, in order
to preserve the execution of contracts, courts allow a party to waive the
right to terminate due to the breach or non-occurrence of an immaterial
provision that inures solely to that party's benefit.
37
The rules that California courts have applied to the waiver doctrine
and the doctrine's fundamental characteristics fall into the following four
general categories.
1. Provision Waived Must Be Immaterial and Technical
A rule that has been consistently applied to waiver cases is that a
party may only waive a provision inserted for its sole benefit if that
provision is immaterial and technical. 38  Examples of provisions deemed
33. See id. Waiver can be an express statement or can be implied from conduct. See id. §
767, at 694.
34. A condition is "a fact, the happening or nonhappening of which creates (condition
precedent) or extinguishes (condition subsequent) a duty on the part of the promisor." WITKIN,
supra note 2, § 721, at 653 (emphasis omitted). A "condition precedent" is a condition that is to
be performed before some act dependent on it is performed. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1436 (West
1982).
35. See Karp, supra note 3, at 11. The case of Sabo v. Fasano, 201 Cal. Rptr. 270 (Ct. App.
1984), involved the use of waiver to avoid an unwanted result. In Sabo, a real estate purchase
offer provided that the offer would be deemed revoked if not accepted within five days of its
execution. See id. at 271. The sellers accepted the offer on the sixth day, but the purchaser did
not object to the late acceptance and instead initiated the escrow process. See id. When the
sellers asserted that they had no obligation to sell because the offer lapsed before they accepted,
the buyer sued for specific performance. See id. at 270-71. The court held that by not objecting
to the late acceptance, the buyer waived the acceptance deadline requirement, which had been
inserted in the contract for his benefit alone. See id. at 271, 274. Thus, the buyer avoided the
unwanted result of being denied the purchase by waiving a provision that had been inserted to
benefit him alone. See generally id. at 270. Another use of waiver to avoid an unwanted result
arises in the landlord-tenant context where a residential lease provision requires payment on a
certain day. If strictly complied with, such a provision would force the landlord to void the lease
upon receipt of a payment just one day late. By waiving the right to receive the payment on time,
the landlord avoids the undesirable result of having to find a new tenant, and the tenant avoids
eviction.
36. See Reeder v. Longo, 182 Cal. Rptr. 287, 290 (Ct. App. 1982).
37. See infra Part II.B.2.
38. See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 819 (1969).
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immaterial and technical include: payment due dates; 39 a real estate
purchase acceptance deadline; 40 a seller's right to payment before delivery
of goods;41 and conditions relating to the delivery deadline and location in a
sales contract.42
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts43 has been cited as supporting
the view that only an immaterial part of a contract may be waived. 44 The
Restatement provides that a subsequent promise to perform a conditional
duty is binding in spite of the non-occurrence of the condition unless the
occurrence of the condition was a material part of the agreed exchange.45
Stated differently, a promise to disregard the non-occurrence of the
condition (to waive the condition) is not binding if that promise materially
affects the value received in the exchange.46
Consistent with this immateriality rule and the corresponding
Restatement view, California courts have upheld waiver in cases involving
relatively minor, technical provisions of the contracts at issue. 7 For
example, in Knarston v. Manhattan Life Insurance Co., 48 the court held that
an insurance company impliedly waived its contractually reserved right to
void a policy by allowing the insured to make a late payment.49 Because
the payment due date was a minor and technical provision, and because it
benefited only the insurance company by ensuring that it would receive
payments at regular intervals, the court's enforcement of the contract was
consistent with the immateriality and sole benefit rules.5 ° Similarly, in
Sabo v. Fasano,51 the court held that a buyer of real estate could waive a
contract provision requiring the sellers to accept the buyer's offer within a
39. See Knarston v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 73 P. 740, 743 (Cal. 1903) (upholding waiver
of an insurance payment due date).
40. See Sabo, 201 Cal. Rptr. 270; see also supra note 35.
41. See WITKIN, supra note 2, § 767, at 694.
42. See id.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1979).
44. See generally Wyler Summit Partnership v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d 658,
665-66 (9th Cir. 1998) (Tashima, J., dissenting); MURRAY, supra note 38, at 819. Although the
Restatement is not a binding authority, many courts cite its provisions related to waiver in
deciding contract disputes. See, e.g., Castle Homes & Dev., Inc. v. City of Brier, 882 P.2d 1172,
1180 n.15 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Westwood Lumber, 829 P.2d 1152,
1160 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
45. RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 84(1)-(1)(a).
46. See id. § 84 cmt. c.
47. See infra notes 48-53.
48. 73 P. 740 (Cal. 1903).
49. See Knarston, 73 P. 740 at 743.
50. See generally id.; see also supra notes 29, 38-46 and accompanying text.
51. 201 Cal. Rptr. 270 (Ct. App. 1984).
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certain time period. As with the due date in Knarston, the court deemed
the acceptance deadline provision in Sabo a minor part of the agreement
that solely benefited the waiving party.53
California courts have generally treated payment due date and
deadline provisions as immaterial and minor contractual terms that can be
waived by one party if inserted solely for that party's benefit.54 Courts
permit waiver in these situations because they are hesitant to invalidate
contracts simply because a minor provision of the agreement proved
undesirable or was not carried out.
55
2. Waiving Party's Right to Terminate or to Refuse to Perform
In addition to the immateriality requirement, contract cases utilizing
the waiver doctrine have shared another common characteristic. In each of
these cases, the waiving party had the right to terminate the contract or to
refuse to perform its duty based on the non-waiving party's breach of the
waived provision, or on the non-occurrence of a condition.56 For instance,
in Knarston, the insurance company had the right to cancel the insured's
policy based on the insured's late payment. 57 Similarly, in Sabo, the real
estate buyer could have terminated the contract because the sellers accepted
his offer after the deadline specified.58
Additionally, in Wesley N. Taylor Co. v. Russell,59 a contract for the
sale of real property allowed the purchaser to void the agreement if he was
unable to obtain a loan on certain terms.60  The court held that the
purchaser waived the conditional provision even though he could have
terminated the contract for having failed to secure the loan terms specified
in the agreement. 6' The court noted that a provision making the contract
contingent upon securing a loan benefits only the purchaser because it
52. See Sabo v. Fasno, 201 Cal. Rptr. 270 (Ct. App. 1984).
53. See generally Sabo, 201 Cal. Rptr. 270.
54. See Knarston, 73 P. at 743; Sabo, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
55. See Reeder v. Longo, 182 Cal. Rptr. 287, 290 (Ct. App. 1982) (noting that "[t]he law...
favors the enforcement of contracts").
56. See, e.g., Knarston, 73 P. 740; Sabo, 201 Cal. Rptr. 270; Mortgage Fin. Corp. v.
Howard, 26 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1962) (holding that the plaintiff waived right to consider the
defendant in default by accepting delinquent installment payment).
57. See generally Knarston, 73 P. 740; see also text accompanying notes 48-50.
58. See Sabo, 201 Cal. Rptr. 270; see also text accompanying notes 51-53.
59. 15 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1961).
60. See id. at 358-59.
61. See id. at 365.
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enables him or her to terminate the contract without being liable for
breach.62
Courts' approval of waiver in these cases reflects the common theme
underlying the waiver doctrine. Because courts favor the enforcement of
contracts, 63 they prefer the waiver of a minor provision to the termination
of the contract.
64
3. Waiver of Certain Types of Provisions Requires Consideration
In several cases governed by California law, the Ninth Circuit has
held that where substantial rights are involved, consideration is required for
a waiver to be valid.65 Although the court has never clearly defined what
constitutes a substantial right, other sources provide a general
understanding of the term's meaning. For example, in his treatise on
California law, Witkin equates a substantial right to materiality.66 He
states:
There can be no waiver of "a material part of the agreed
exchange"; i.e., the party entitled to performance cannot by a
mere declaration or other acts, unsupported by consideration, give
up the entire benefit of the contract. Thus, a buyer may ... not
[waive] the right to receive the goods; and a seller ... cannot by a
mere waiver give up his right to receive the price.67
Further, American Jurisprudence Second68 cites the Ninth Circuit case
United States v. Chichester,69 and notes that "there may be a valid waiver
of formal, as distinguished from substantial, rights without a
consideration .... , 70 Although this does not explain what a substantial
right is, it does indicate what it is not. Chichester makes clear that a formal
provision-one that other authorities describe as an immaterial and
technical provision71--does not involve a substantial right.
72
62. See id.
63. See Reeder v. Longo, 182 Cal. Rptr. 287, 290 (Ct. App. 1982).
64. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Rennie & Laughlin, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 242 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1957)
(holding that "[w]here substantive rights are involved.. . waiver must be supported by either an
agreed consideration or by acts amounting to an estoppel"); Pacific States Corp. v. Hall, 166 F.2d
668 (9th Cir. 1948).
66. WITKIN, supra note 2, § 767, at 694.
67. Id.
68. 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver (1997).
69. 312 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1963).
70. 28 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 68, § 159 (emphasis added).
71. See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 38, at 819 (stating that cases where waiver without
consideration has been allowed usually involve conditions that are immaterial and technical).
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In addition, the fact that California courts have only allowed waiver
without consideration where the waived provisions are immaterial and
technical73 indicates that provisions involving substantial rights are material
terms of a contract. This is corroborated by Witkin and American
Jurisprudence Second.74 Further, other jurisdictions have described a
substantial right as one relating to a substantial part of the contract.7 5
The two leading Ninth Circuit cases that deal with the issue of
substantial rights are Pacific States Corp. v. Hall7 6 and Rennie & Laughlin,
Inc. v. Chrysler Corp.77 In Pacific States, a debtor alleged that a creditor
company had waived its right to receive interest by failing to reflect the
interest owed on several documents sent to the debtor.78 The Ninth Circuit
held that the creditor's right to receive interest on a $45,000 loan was a
substantial right.7 9 Therefore, because the debtor gave no consideration for
the alleged waiver of the substantial right, the court held that the waiver
was invalid.80
The Pacific States court did not elaborate on why the receipt of
interest constitutes a substantial right.81 However, its decision is consistent
with Witkin's statement that California law does not allow a party to waive
the entire benefit of the contract. 82  The fundamental benefit a creditor
receives for granting a loan is the receipt of interest. No credible argument
can be made that a provision specifying the percentage of interest to be
assessed against a debtor is an immaterial term, or that it is not related to a
substantial part of the contract. Thus, the Ninth Circuit's holding in Pacific
States is in accord with its own precedent on waiver, with Witkin's treatise
on California contract law and with the definition of substantial right
adhered to by other jurisdictions.
Similarly, in Rennie & Laughlin,8 3 the court rejected the waiver of a
substantial right due to lack of consideration.8 4 In that case, the contract
between a franchised automobile dealer and a car manufacturer provided
72. See generally 28 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 68, § 159.
73. See supra Part II.B. 1.
74. See WITKIN, supra note 2, § 767, at 694; 28 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 68, § 159.
75. See 17A AM. JuR. 2D Contracts § 657 (1991).
76. 166 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1948).
77. 242 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1957).
78. Pacific States Corp. v. Hall, 166 F.2d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 1948).
79. See id. at 669, 671-72.
80. See id. at 671.
81. See generally Pacific States, 166 F.2d 668.
82. See WITKIN, supra note 2, § 767, at 694.
83. 242 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1957).
84. See Rennie, 242 F.2d at 211.
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that the dealer had to obtain the written consent of the manufacturer prior to
assigning the franchise agreement.85 After the manufacturer refused to
approve the sale of the franchise to purchasers that the manufacturer
brought in, the dealer sued for breach of contract.86 The dealer claimed the
manufacturer waived its right to require written consent when the
manufacturer introduced the purchasers. The Ninth Circuit held the
dealer could not base his action on waiver because, while substantive
rights88 were involved, there had been no consideration offered. 89
As in Pacific States, the Rennie & Laughlin court failed to explain
why it felt substantive rights were at issue in the case.90 However, an
automobile manufacturer has a significant interest in approving potential
dealers of its products. Thus, a provision requiring prior approval can
hardly be equated to an immaterial provision such as a payment due date.
91
In sum, California courts allow waiver of immaterial or technical
provisions without consideration. 92  On the other hand, where a party
wishes to waive a material provision, or a provision relating to a substantial
part of the contract, California courts require consideration to validate a
waiver.
93
4. California's Prohibition of Offensive Waiver
California courts have uniformly upheld the use of waiver if its use
complies with the rules regarding immateriality, the right to terminate and
consideration. 94  This valid use of waiver is referred to as "defensive"
because it protects the waiving party from an unwanted result, such as
termination of the contract, due to the other party's non-performance.
95
Defensive waiver does not result in the imposition of legal duties on the
non-waiving party that were not a part of the original contract.
96
85. See id. at 209.
86. See id. at 209-10.
87. See id. at 210.
88. In the contractual waiver context, the Ninth Circuit seems to use "substantial" and
"substantive" interchangeably. See, e.g., Rennie & Laughlin, 242 F.2d 208 (using term
"substantive"); Pacific States, 166 F.2d 668 (using term "substantial").
89. Rennie & Laughlin, 242 F.2d at 211.
90. See id.
91. Compare Rennie & Laughlin, 242 F.2d at 211, with Knarston v. Manhattan Life Ins.
Co., 73 P. 740, 743 (Cal. 1903) (upholding waiver of an insurance payment due date).
92. See supra Part It.B.1.
93. See supra notes 65-66, 76-89 and accompanying text.
94. See supra Parts lI.B. 1-3.
95. See supra Part II.B.2.
96. See, e.g., Rennie & Laughlin, 242 F.2d at 210.
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An example of the use of defensive Waiver is where a landlord waives
his right to terminate a lease by accepting rent after the date required under
the contract. This waiver neither harms the tenant nor imposes on him or
her any additional duties under the lease. Thus, enforcement of the waiver
preserves the lease agreement, allows the landlord to avoid an unwanted
termination of the lease and does not penalize the tenant in the process.
This use of waiver allows for a fair and desirable result for all parties to the
contract despite the breach of an immaterial condition.
While California federal and state courts have approved the defensive
use of waiver, they have consistently prohibited the offensive use of the
waiver doctrine. 97 Unlike a defensive waiver, an offensive use of waiver
adds a duty to the obligations of the non-waiving party that was not
originally a part of the contract.98 In Rennie & Laughlin, the Ninth Circuit
unequivocally stated the rule against offensive waiver: "[I]t is settled that
waiver can be employed only for defensive purposes. It can preclude the
assertion of legal rights but it cannot be used to impose legal duties. The
shield cannot serve as a sword."99
In Groves v. Prickett,100 the Ninth Circuit refused to allow the
offensive use of waiver. 10 1 The court rejected a corporation's argument that
a purchaser of its stock had waived unsatisfied conditions in the escrow
agreement that solely benefited the purchaser, and that the purchaser was
thus obligated to pay the balance of $45,000.102 Citing Rennie & Laughlin,
the court held the corporation could not impose on the purchaser the duty to
pay despite the non-occurrence of the conditions precedent by claiming that
the purchaser had waived the provisions.' °3 Because there was no evidence
that the purchaser had waived the provisions, crediting the corporation's
argument would have resulted in imposing a duty on the purchaser that was
not in the original agreement: the duty to pay despite the fact that the
required conditions under the original contract had not occurred.1' 4 Thus,
the court refused to permit the corporation's attempt to employ offensive
waiver.
0 5
97. See Groves v. Prickett, 420 F.2d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 1970); Rennie & Laughlin, 242
F.2d at 210.
98. See Groves, 420 F.2d at 1125; Karp, supra note 3, at 13.
99. Rennie & Laughlin, 242 F.2d at 210 (footnote omitted).
100. 420 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1970).
101. See id.
102. See id. at 1121-23, 1125.
103. See id. at 1125.
104. See id. at 1125-26.
105. See id.
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By contrast, in Reeder v. Longo,'0 6 the court upheld a waiver, but
emphasized that the use employed by the plaintiff was defensive rather than
offensive.10 7 In Reeder, a buyer brought suit for specific performance of a
real estate agreement, and claimed he had expressly waived a subordination
provision inserted solely for his benefit.'0 8  Because the provision was
invalid, it would have rendered the contract void had the buyer not waived
it.'0 9 Unlike the corporation's attempted use of waiver in Groves v.
Prickett, l 0 the buyer's waiver in Reeder was defensive."' Waiver of the
provision did not impose new duties on the seller; it simply resulted in
saving the contract from invalidation." 2 In allowing the waiver, the court
noted that the provision's removal would not prejudice the seller.1 3 The
court's reasoning implies that if the waiver had been used offensively to
impose a new duty on the seller, the court would not have enforced it. 1
4
It is well-settled that it is not within a court's purview to rewrite
contracts. 115 Because offensive waiver has the effect of imposing a new
duty on the non-waiving party, its use essentially enables one party to
rewrite a contract. 1 6 A court's approval of the offensive use of waiver is
therefore tantamount to participating in the unilateral rewriting of a
contract. Case law provides limited guidance as to the reasons courts have
prohibited offensive waiver. It seems likely, however, that offensive
waiver's fundamental similarity to the unilateral rewriting of a contract
underlies its prohibition.
106. 182 Cal Rptr. 287 (Ct. App. 1982).
107. See id. at 290.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 289.
110. 420 F.2d 1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 1970); see also supra notes 101-06 and
accompanying text.
111. Reeder, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 U.S. 452, 462 (1894) (holding that
"[t]he courts may not make a contract for the parties. Their function and duty consist simply in
enforcing and carrying out the one actually made."); American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 186 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (stating that "[i]n interpreting a
contract, a court should not rewrite the contract between the parties"); In re Mission Ins. Co., 48
Cal. Rptr. 2d 209, 215 (Ct. App. 1995) (stating that "[w]hen the language of a contract is plain
and unambiguous it is not within the province of a court to rewrite or alter by construction what
has been agreed upon") (citing Crow v. P.E.G. Constr. Co., 319 P.2d 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957)).
116. See Karp, supra note 3, at 13.
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III. WYLER SUMMIT PARTNERSHIP V. TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.
A. Background
In 1958, William Wyler and MGM-Loew's ("MGM") executed a
written contract calling for Wyler to direct the motion picture Ben Hur.
17
In consideration for Wyler's services, MGM was to pay him $350,000 plus
three percent of any gross receipts the film earned in excess of $20
million."u 8  The contract specified that MGM would pay Wyler's
percentage compensation in "annual installments not to exceed the sum of
$50,000 in any one year."' 19 As of January 31, 1995, Ben Hur had grossed
over $131 million. 120 However, due to the yearly cap on Wyler's
percentage compensation, Turner owed more than $1.5 million in deferred
compensation to Wyler's heirs. 121
In 1995, Wyler Summit, a partnership formed by the director's heirs,
notified MGM's successor in interest, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.
("Turner"), that it desired to waive the installment payment provision of the
Ben Hur contract, and requested that Turner remit the unpaid portion of the
percentage compensation owed to Wyler Summit. 12 2 When Turner refused,
Wyler Summit filed suit in the Northern District of California, claiming
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty and breach
of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. 23 The heirs sought a
reformation of the contract to eliminate the installment payment provision
and remission of the percentage compensation owed. 1
24
Wyler Summit alleged that the installment payment provision had
been inserted into the contract solely for Wyler's benefit. The heirs
contended the purpose of the cap was to allow Wyler to avoid the heavy
income taxes he would have otherwise owed if he had been paid the total
117. Wyler Summit Partnership v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 659 (9th Cir.
1998).
118. See id.
119. Id. at 659.
120. See id. at 660 n.2. The film earned more Academy Awards than any other previously
released film, including: Best Picture (Sam Zimbalist, producer); Best Actor (Charlton Heston);
Best Supporting Actor (Hugh Griffith); and Best Director (Wyler). Id. (citing Academy Awards
for 1959 (visited Sept. 6, 1997) <http://us.imdb.com/Oscars/oscars1959.html>).
121. See id. Wyler died in 1981, and his heirs subsequently became his successors in
interest to the Ben Hur contract. Id. at 660 n.3.
122. See id. at 660.
123. See Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 660.
124. See id. The heirs also demanded a book accounting and declaratory relief to determine
the parties' rights and obligations under the contract. See id.
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percentage compensation each year.' 25 Wyler Summit further contended
that because the provision had been inserted solely for Wyler's benefit, it
could be waived at his request, 126 and that the parties had never intended
for the provision to result in depriving Wyler or his heirs of the full
compensation owed. 127 Finally, Wyler Summit argued that by refusing to
remit the unpaid compensation amount, Turner was receiving an
unintended windfall at Wyler Summit's expense by continuing to earn
significant interest on the balance owed. 1
28
In response to the Wyler Summit suit, Turner filed a motion to
dismiss, asserting that Wyler Summit had failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. 129 In support of its motion, Turner argued
that the language of the contract clearly called for it to pay a maximum of
$50,000 per year, and that the compensation owed to Wyler Summit would
ultimately be paid in the aggregate as a result of those years where the
percentage amount owed was less than $50,000. 130 Turner conceded that
the company would continue to "earn and retain interest income"' 3' on the
unpaid compensation until the full amount was paid, but contended that this
reflected the intent of Wyler and MGM in drafting the contract.
3 2
B. District Court Decision
The District Court granted Turner's motion and dismissed all of
Wyler Summit's claims. 3 3 The court held that Wyler Summit could not
waive the contract's installment provision because the contract did not
contain a clause authorizing such a waiver, nor did the contract indicate
that the percentage compensation cap was included solely for Wyler's
benefit. 134 The court concluded that the installment payment provision also
benefited Turner by allowing it to defer paying the total compensation
125. See id. Under the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, the marginal tax rate for taxable
income over $100,000 was 89 percent; for taxable income over S 150,000, the rate was 90 percent;
and for taxable income over $200,000, the rate increased to 91 percent. See id. at 660 n.5.
126. See id. at 660.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 661.
129. See Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 661.
130. See id. at 661. In other words, should three percent of the film's gross receipts for one
year amount to less than $50,000, Turner would remit the full $50,000 and apply the surplus to
the amount owed.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 662.
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owed, and thus receiving and retaining interest on the unremitted portion.
1 35
Wyler Summit appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.1
36
C. Ninth Circuit Majority Decision
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit began its opinion by
noting that it affirmed the district court's dismissal with the exception of
the breach of contract claim. 37 As to that claim, the Ninth Circuit found
that the lower court had committed two reversible errors. 38 First, the court
held that the district court was mistaken in interpreting the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Eichman v. Fotomat Corp.139 to mean that under California law,
waiver can be employed only if it is authorized by some other provision of
the contract. 1
40
Second, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court erred by
resolving what the majority deemed to be a factual issue-whether the
installment payment provision was inserted solely for Wyler's
benefit-and thus violated the standards applicable to deciding a motion to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 14 1 The majority
stated that in deciding 12(b)(6) motions, a court may not resolve factual
issues such as whether the payment provision was actually put in the
contract to benefit only Wyler142 Thus, the majority held that the lower
court should have accepted Wyler Summit's well-pleaded allegations as
true and construed them in a light most favorable to Wyler Summit, instead
of making a factual determination as to the intent of the parties with regard
to the payment provision. 1
43
135. See Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 662.
136. See id. at 659.
137. See id. at 661.
138. See id. at 663.
139. 880 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1989).
140. See Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 662.
141. See id. at 663. Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to make a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim as a separate motion instead of as part of a responsive pleading. See FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(6).
142. See Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 663 (quoting Crescenta Valley Moose Lodge No. 808 v.
Bunt, 87 Cal. Rptr. 428, 431 (Ct. App. 1970) (stating that "[w]hether a condition is solely for the
benefit of [a particular contracting party] is for the trial court to determine as a fact from all the
evidence")). However, the Wyler Summit court also noted that in WYDA Associates v. Merner, 50
Cal. Rptr. 2d 323, 330 (Ct. App. 1996), a California appellate court held that the benefit issue was
a matter of law, not fact. See Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 663 n.10. The dissent found this the
better rule. See infra Part II.E.
143. See Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 664.
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The majority held that the district court was required to accept Wyler
Summit's allegation that the installment payment provision was included in
the contract solely for Wyler's benefit. 144 The court then noted that "it is a
well-established principle of California law that 'a contracting party may
waive conditions placed in a contract solely for the party's benefit.""
145
Because the majority felt Wyler Summit had made a sufficient allegation of
waiver, it held that the complaint stated a cause of action for breach of
contract based on Turner's alleged failure to perform (failure to remit the
full compensation owed) in accordance with Wyler Summit's claim that it
had waived the payment provision. 146 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed
the lower court's decision on the breach of contract claim and remanded for
trial on the factual issue of whether the installment payment provision was
inserted in the contract solely for Wyler's benefit.
147
D. Inconsistencies Between the Majority Decision and California Law
In allowing Wyler Summit to proceed on its breach of contract claim,
the Ninth Circuit ignored both California statutes and common law. 148 The
Ninth Circuit had previously held that on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may
consider exhibits to a complaint, such as a contract, in addition to the
allegations stated in the complaint. 49 Also, California Civil Code Section
1639 provides that the intent of parties should be determined from the
contract itself, if possible.150 Thus, the Wyler Summit majority should not
have merely accepted Wyler Summit's allegation of waiver on its face.' 51
Instead, to determine whether the installment payment provision was
inserted solely for Wyler's benefit, the court should have looked to the Ben
Hur contract.152 In holding that the district court erred by looking beyond
the complaint instead of accepting Wyler Summit's allegation as true, the
144. See id. at 664.
145. Id. at 662 (quoting Sabo v. Fasano, 201 Cal. Rptr. 270, 271 (Ct. App. 1984)).
146. See id. at 664.
147. See id.
148. See infra Part ILE.
149. See, e.g., Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 625 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that if
an alleged contract attached to a complaint contradicts allegations of a complaint, "the court need
not accept the allegations as being true" (citing Ott v. Home Savings & Loan Ass'n, 265 F.2d
643, 646 n.1 (9th Cir. 1958))); Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir.
1987) (stating that a court may consider documents attached to a complaint, such as a contract, in
addition to the allegations of the complaint itself); see also supra Part II.A.
150. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1639 (West 1985); see also supra Part II.A.
151. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1639; see also supra Part II.A.
152. See Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 663-64; CAL. CIv. CODE § 1639; see also supra Part
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Ninth Circuit majority contradicted California statutory and common law,
and the court's own case law.'
53
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit failed to recognize that the situation in
Wyler Summit is distinguishable from those cases where California courts
have approved the use of waiver.1 54  First, the court did not apply the
commonly stated rule that only waivers of immaterial and technical
provisions are valid in the absence of consideration. 5 As discussed above,
the Ninth Circuit has previously held that where a contractual provision
involves a substantial right, any attempt to waive it must be supported by
consideration. 56 The court has never precisely defined "substantial right"
in the waiver context, nor has it confronted the specific issue of whether an
installment payment provision involves substantial rights.1 57  However,
other sources of law indicate that a substantial right correlates to a material
term of a contract, or to a term related to a substantial part of the
contract.
158
The Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Chichester159 is
instructive in determining what constitutes a substantial right. In
Chichester, the court held that the Government had not waived its right to
terminate a contract with a bomb manufacturer that continuously failed to
153. See supra notes 149-150 and accompanying text; Wilson v. United Airlines, No. C 98-
2460, 1998 WL 754602, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 1998) (holding that in deciding a motion to
dismiss, the court should accept all material allegations in the complaint as true and construe
them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant unless exhibits attached to the complaint
contradict the allegations made therein); see also supra Part II.A.
154. See supra Parts II.B.1 -II.B.4.
155. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 6, § 11-31, at 493; see supra Parts II.B.1,
II.B.3.
156. See, e.g., Rennie & Laughlin, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 242 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1957)
("where substantive rights are involved it is said frequently that waiver must be supported by
either an agreed consideration or by acts amounting to an estoppel"); see also supra Part 11.13.3.
Waiver of a provision involving a substantial right equates to a modification of the contract. See
CALAMARI & PERJLLO, supra note 6, § 11-31, at 494. Thus, because modification of a contract
requires consideration, the rule that waiver of a substantial right also requires consideration is
consistent with fundamental contract principles. See id.; Rennie & Laughlin, 242 F.2d at 211.
157. Other authorities do state that a payment provision is a material contract term,
however. See, e.g., Pacific States Corp. v. Hall, 166 F.2d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 1948) (stating that an
interest percentage provision involved substantial rights); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 6, §
11-31, at 493. To illustrate the point that a payment provision is a material contract term,
Calamari & Perillo give the following example:
[I]f A agreed to paint B's house and B promised to pay $1,000 and immediately
after the promise was made B promised to pay $1,000 even if A did not perform,
the waiver would not be effective because there is an attempt to waive a material
part of the agreed exchange.
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 6, § 11-31, at 493.
158. See supra Part II.B.3.
159. 312 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1963).
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deliver the number of bombs per month specified in the contract.160
Reiterating its holding from Pacific States Corp. v. Hall,161 the Ninth
Circuit stated that "where substantial rights are involved, a waiver must be
supported by consideration to be valid."' 162 The court then found that the
amount at issue, $437,059, constituted a substantial right.
163
The holdings of Pacific States and Chichester, as well as the
statements of other legal authorities regarding the substantial right
concept,' 64 indicate that an installment payment provision is a material term
of a contract and thus implicates substantial rights, especially where a
significant amount of money is involved. 65 In Wyler Summit, the amount
claimed to be due was over $1.5 million.' 66  Given the Ninth Circuit's
holding in Chichester that a potential claim of $437,059 constituted a
substantial right, Wyler Summit's claim for over one million dollars should
also be regarded as a substantial right.
The Ninth Circuit's failure to analyze Wyler Summit's claim under
Pacific States Corp. and Chichester is a significant oversight. Had the
court adhered to its own precedent, it could have found that Wyler
Summit's allegation of waiver was not sufficient because it desired to
waive a provision involving a substantial right and a significant amount of
money without offering any consideration in exchange. 16  The majority
should have affirmed the district court's dismissal of Wyler Summit's
waiver claim for this reason alone.
160. See United States v. Chichester, 312 F.2d 275, 278, 283 (9th Cir. 1963).
161. 166 F.2d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 1984); see also supra Part II.B.3.
162. Chichester, 312 F.2d at 282 (quoting Pacific States, 166 F.2d at 671).
163. See id.
164. See supra Part II.B.3.
165. See Chichester, 312 F.2d at 282; Pacific States, 166 F.2d at 671 (holding that an
interest percentage provision involved substantial rights).
166. 135 F.3d at 660.
167. See id.; see also MURRAY, supra note 38, at 819. Murray supports the view that
consideration is required for waiver of conditions that are not merely immaterial and technical.
See id. He criticizes Bowman v. Surety Fund Life Ins. Co., 182 N.W. 991 (Minn. 1921), as a case
that violates this rule. See id. In Bowman, an insurer was held to have waived its right not to pay
despite the fact that the decedent had breached the policy condition against entering into military
service, and that there was no consideration given for the supposed waiver. See id. Murray
notes:
It was held that an indication of an intention to pay, made with knowledge of the
fact that the insured had been killed in action, made the company liable in spite of
the breach of condition, although there was neither consideration nor the elements
of a promissory estoppel. The new promise involved such a radical change in the
extent of the obligation originally assumed by the insurer that it may be doubted
whether there was any justification in holding it to be binding in the absence of the
elements requisite to the creation of liability in the first instance.
Id. (emphasis added).
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By ignoring its own precedent and allowing Wyler Summit to pursue
its claim, the Ninth Circuit sanctioned Wyler Summit's attempt to modify a
central term of the contract without Turner's agreement. Approving such a
modification essentially permits Wyler Summit to unilaterally rewrite the
contract, which has long been prohibited under contract law.'
68
Wyler Summit's desired application of the waiver doctrine differs
from the typical application of waiver in two additional ways. First,
waivable provisions are usually conditions precedent to the waiving party's
performance. 169 Under the California Civil Code, a condition precedent is
defined as a condition that is to be performed before some act dependent on
it is performed. 7 °  Applying this definition to the Wyler Summit
installment payment provision, it appears that the provision does not
qualify as a condition precedent to Wyler Summit's performance. The
intent of the original Wyler-MGM contract was that Wyler would perform
by directing the movie before any percentage compensation payments from
movie proceeds were due under the installment provision. 171 Thus, because
Wyler's performance was due before MGM/Turner was obligated to pay
him, his performance was a condition precedent to any installment
payments being made. Therefore, waiver of the payment provision in
Wyler Summit is inconsistent with the traditional waiver scenario. 1
72
Second, in typical waiver cases, waiver of a contract provision
constitutes an intentional abandonment of the right to terminate the
contract, or to refuse to perform based on the other party's breach or on the
non-occurrence of a conditional provision. 173 The party abandons the right
to terminate or to refuse to perform in order to continue receiving the
benefits of the contract.7 4 By contrast, in Wyler Summit, the plaintiff did
not allege any breach, nor was there evidence offered to show that Tumer
had breached any provision of the original contract. 75 Therefore, Wyler
Summit's attempted waiver did not constitute an abandonment of a right to
168. See, e.g., American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 186 F. Supp.
904, 908 (S.D. Cal. 1960), affd, 292 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1961); see also supra Part II.B.4.
169. See Karp, supra note 3, at 11. Witkin defines condition as "a fact, the happening or
non-happening of which creates (condition precedent) or extinguishes (condition subsequent) a
duty on the part of the promisor." WITIN, supra note 2, § 721, at 653.
170. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1436 (West 1982).
171. See Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 659; see supra Part III.A.
172. See Karp, supra note 3, at 11.
173. See Sabo v. Fasano, 201 Cal. Rptr. 270, 271 (Ct. App. 1984); see also supra Part
I1.B.2.
174. See WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note 26, § 678, at 239; Karp, supra note 3, at 11; see
also supra Part I.B.2.
175. See Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 667 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
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terminate. The absence of any breach by Turner part represents another
distinction between Wyler Summit's attempted waiver and those cases
where waiver has normally been upheld.
Finally, the most significant problem with the Wyler Summit decision
is that by allowing Wyler Summit to proceed in its suit, the Ninth Circuit
seems to condone the offensive use of waiver and its concomitant
imposition of additional duties on the non-waiving party.' 76 Should Wyler
Summit succeed on remand, the waiver of the payment provision will
create an additional duty for Turner that was not identified in the contract:
the duty to remit in one payment the total accrued compensation owed to
the heirs. 177 As the Wyler Summit dissent observed, "the only effect of
waiving the installment payment provision is to add to the performance
obligations of Turner, the non-waiving party, to pay more, earlier, than was
originally required under the contract.'1
78
Although California state and federal courts had not allowed
offensive waiver in any case prior to Wyler Summit,179 the Ninth Circuit
majority in Wyler Summit failed to address the well-settled distinction
between offensive and defensive waiver.' 80 In effect, the court held that the
same rules apply to both. 181 In doing so, and in reversing the dismissal of
Wyler Summit's breach of contract claim, the court implicitly permitted the
offensive use of waiver. Allowing one party to impose a duty on another
party that was not within the original contract is tantamount to rewriting the
contract--something that courts have consistently been hesitant to do. 8 '
Wyler Summit's unprecedented holding provides a legal foundation
for a party seeking to unilaterally modify terms of a contract. 83 Relying on
Wyler Summit, a party who has become unhappy with a contract term may
now survive a motion to dismiss by simply alleging that it has the right to
waive and technically rewrite that term because it was included in the
contract for that party's sole benefit. 84 The fact that waiver of such a
provision would clearly impose a new duty on the other party is irrelevant
under Wyler Summit.
176. See Rennie & Laughlin, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 242 F.2d 208, 210 (9th Cir. 1957)
(holding that offensive waiver is not valid).
177. See Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 661-62.
178. Id. at 666 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
179. See supra Part II.B.4.
180. See Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 659-64.
181. See Karp, supra note 3, at 12.
182. See supra Part II.B.4.
183. See infra Part III.F.
184. See Karp, supra note 3, at 12.
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Given the importance of contract stability in the entertainment
industry,185 the Wyler Summit precedent may have serious negative
repercussions in the field. Thus, if Wyler Summit has the effect of allowing
certain parties to unilaterally modify contracts and impose new contractual
duties on the non-waiving party, the case could present significant
problems for entertainment attorneys. 1
86
E. The Ninth Circuit Dissent
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit majority, the dissent called for the
application of the traditional rules regarding contractual waiver that are
firmly grounded in California contract principles and in the court's prior
decisions.
187
The dissent argued that the district court did not commit either of the
reversible errors found by the majority.188 First, the dissent stated that the
interpretation of a contract is a matter of law, not a question of fact.189 As
such, the dissent felt the district court's consideration of the contract
language in addition to the complaint did not violate the rule against
deciding factual issues on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 190
The dissent conformed to Ninth Circuit precedent19' in stating that
Wyler Summit's "allegation [that the payment provision was inserted
solely for its benefit] is not entitled to be accepted as true because ... it is
contradicted by a plain reading of the contract."' 192 The dissent found no
indication in the Wyler-MGM contract that the installment payment
provision was intended solely to benefit Wyler. 193 Therefore, the dissent
185. See generally id. at 13.
186. See infra Part III.F.
187. See Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 664-67 (Tashima, J., dissenting); see supra Part II.B.
188. See Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 664 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
189. See id. at 664-65 (citing HS Servs., Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 109 F.3d 642,
644 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the interpretation of an insurance contract was a question of law
to be reviewed de novo)).
190. Id. at 664-65.
191. See, e.g., Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 625 n.I (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that if
a contract attached to a complaint contradicts allegations of a complaint, the court need not accept
those allegations as true); Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court is not limited to considering the
allegations in a complaint, but can also consider documents that are part of the complaint).
192. Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 665 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
193. The dissent addressed the compelling point that if, as Wyler Summit contends, Wyler
insisted the installment payment provision be inserted in order to avoid heavy income taxes, then
he "surely had no subjective intent that the provision could be waived by him. Otherwise, he
would have run afoul of the constructive receipt of income doctrine, making all of his percentage
compensation immediately taxable to him upon its receipt by MGM." Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at
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believed contract interpretation rules and precedent compelled the majority
to let the contract guide its analysis, instead of deciding based on the
allegations of Wyler Summit's complaint.1 94 According to the dissent, the
only sensible interpretation of the contract was that the payment provision
was intended to benefit both parties: forbearing payment of the total
amount owed to Wyler benefited MGM, and saving on taxes benefited
Wyler.' 95
The dissent's assertion that the majority should have relied on the
Wyler-MGM contract to decide Turner's motion to dismiss is supported by
both Ninth Circuit precedent' 96 and California state case law. The dissent
cited 197 WYDA Associates v. Merner,198 where the court held the contract
should direct a court's decision on a motion for summary judgment of a
contract dispute.' 99 The court based this holding on California Civil Code
section 1639, which states that where possible, the intention of the parties
to a written contract should be ascertained from the contract alone.200 The
Wyler Summit dissent noted that although a conflict exists in California
case law as to how a contract should be construed on a Rule (12)(b)(6)
201motion, the rule stated in WYDA Associates is the better one.
The majority, on the other hand, relied on two older state appellate
cases that held the issue of whether a condition was placed in a contract for
665 n.2. (Tashima, J., dissenting). For support, the judge cited 2 MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION § 10.01 (1998), which provides:
The doctrine of constructive receipt requires that a taxpayer be treated as having
received an amount when it is credited to his account, set apart for him, or
otherwise made available so that he may draw upon it at any time, or so that he
could have drawn upon it during the taxable year if notice of an intention to
withdraw had been given.
Id. That section specifically notes that "the doctrine of constructive receipt is sometimes applied
to deferred compensation arrangements." Id. Whether Wyler's deferred percentage
compensation falls under this doctrine is beyond the scope of this Note. However, if the court
had examined this issue and found that the doctrine did apply, the court would likely have been
compelled to interpret the provision as not having been inserted solely for Wyler's benefit, and
thus not waivable, so as not to render the contract violative of income tax laws. See CAL. Crv.
CODE § 1643 (West 1985) (providing that "[a] contract must receive such an interpretation as will
make it lawful..."); 2 MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 10.01 (1998); see also
City of San Diego v. Rider, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422, 433 (Ct. App. 1996) (stating that "[u]nder basic
rules of statutory and contract construction, provisions subject to both lawful and unlawful
interpretations are to be interpreted in a manner which makes them lawful").
194. See Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 665 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
195. See id.
196. See Roth, 942 F.2d at 625 n.1.
197. See Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 665 n. I (Tashima, J., dissenting).
198. 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323 (Ct. App. 1996).
199. See WYDA Assocs. v. Memer, 50 Cal. Rptr. 323, 326-27 (Ct. App. 1996).
200. See id. at 327 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1639 (West 1985)).
201. See Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 665 n. 1 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
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the benefit of one party was a factual determination.20 2 A court may not
decide any factual issues on a 12(b)(6) motion.20 3 Therefore, in the
majority's view, the district court erred in making any determination as to
which party the payment provision was intended to benefit.
20 4
205However, the court's ruling ignored two of its own recent cases.
These cases held that on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court must include
attachments to the complaint in its analysis and thus must review terms
contained in an attached contract.20 6 The court is not obligated to accept
the complaint allegations as true where they are contradicted by an exhibit
to the complaint.2 07 Thus, the dissent's argument that the district court was
correct in basing its dismissal of Wyler Summit's claim on the contract
language is well-founded.20 8
In its discussion of the waiver doctrine, the dissent noted that the
majority's reliance on the waiver cases, beginning with Knarston v.
Manhattan Life Insurance Co., 209 was misplaced because each of those
cases involved waiver of a minor or procedural condition. 210 The dissent
was correct in noting that, unlike the installment payment provision in the
Ben Hur contract, none of the waivable provisions were fundamental terms
of the contracts at issue.211 In fact, the majority conceded that most of the
waiver cases it cited concerned minor or procedural conditions precedent to
performance, but the court remained silent on the issue of whether the
payment provision in Wyler Summit fit into that category. 21 2 In contrast,
the dissent correctly recognized that the provision at issue in Wyler Summit
was fundamentally different from the type normally held waivable. 1 3
202. See id. at 663 (citing Crescenta Valley Moose Lodge No. 808 v. Bunt, 87 Cal. Rptr.
428, 431 (Ct. App. 1970)); Wesley N. Taylor Co. v. Russell, 15 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1961).
203. Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 663.
204. See id.
205. See Roth, 942 F.2d at 625 n. 1; Durning, 815 F.2d at 1266-67.
206. See Roth, 942 F.2d at 625 n.l; Durning, 815 F.2d at 1266-67.
207. See Durning, 815 F.2d at 1266.
208. See Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 665 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
209. 73 P. 740 (Cal. 1903).
210. Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 665 (Tashima J., dissenting); see also discussion of
Knarston supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
211. See Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 666 (Tashima, J., dissenting); see also supra Part I.B. 1.
212. Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 662. The court simply stated that it nevertheless did not see
why application of waiver should not be allowed in Wyler Summit. See id.
213. See id. at 665 (Tashima, J., dissenting). The majority also unwittingly weakened its
own argument by mentioning the black letter rule that a waivable provision is normally one that is
precedent to the waiving party's performance. See id. at 662. As discussed in Part 111.D, the
installment payment provision in the Wyler-MGM contract was not a condition precedent to
Wyler's duties. See id. at 659-60.
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In addition, the dissent analogized the Wyler-MGM contract to
contracts in other waiver cases and argued that the majority ignored
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 84(1).214 The dissent interpreted
that section as prohibiting waiver from materially altering the parties'
agreed upon exchange.215 According to the dissent, such a change may be
accomplished only through modification of the contract by mutual consent
or estoppel.216 The dissent felt the installment provision was a fundamental
term of the Ben Hur contract, and waiver of the provision would materially
alter the exchange between the parties.217 As such, the provision should not
be subject to "unilateral waiver" by Wyler Summit.218 Furthermore, in the
dissent's view, Wyler Summit's use of waiver violated the Restatement rule
that a promise to disregard the non-occurrence of the condition is not
binding if it materially affects the value received by the promisor.219 In
support of this contention, the dissent cited several California cases in
which courts held that a party cannot waive a critical provision of a
contract. 220 The dissent's reasoning is analogous to arguments employed
by the Ninth Circuit in cases holding that provisions involving substantial
rights may not be waived without consideration.22'
The dissent observed that the effect of waiving the installment
provision was to add to the performance obligation of Turner, the non-
waiving party, and accurately characterized this use of waiver as
offensive.222 The dissent pointed out that the court had expressly prohibited
this use of waiver in cases such as Groves v. Prickett2 23 and Rennie &
Laughlin, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp.
22 4
The dissent also noted that waiver is justified when it "spares one of
the parties (usually the non-waiving party) the loss that would occur if the
214. See id. at 665-66 (Tashima, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 84(1) & cmrts. c-d (1979)).
215. See id.
216. See id. at 666.
217. See id.
218. See Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 666 (describing unilateral waiver as waiver desired by
only one party).
219. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84, cmt. c (1979).
220. See Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 666 (Tashinia, J., dissenting) (citing Intel Corp. v.
Hartford Accident Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551 (9th Cir. 1991), Conner v. Union Auto Ins. Co., 9
P.2d 863 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932)).
221. See United States v. Chichester, 312 F.2d 275, 282 (9th Cir. 1963); Pacific States Corp.
v. Hall, 166 F.2d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 1948); see also supra Part II.B.3.
222. Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 667 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
223. 420 F.2d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 1970).
224. 242 F.2d 208, 210 (9th Cir. 1957); see Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 666 (Tashima, J.,
dissenting); see also supra Part I1.B.4.
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waiving party's performance were excused by failure of the condition. 225
However, as the dissent recognized, this justification is inapposite to Wyler
Summit because Wyler fully performed his duties under the contract over
forty years prior to the suit's inception.226 Accordingly, there was no
performance for the waiving party to preserve.227
Finally, the dissent could find no case to support the majority's
holding that a non-waiving party's continued performance pursuant to the
allegedly waived provision constituted a breach of contract. 228 The dissent
concluded by noting:
The majority's new formula for waiver will no doubt have a
corrosive effect on the stability of contractual relations,
particularly long-term agreements. Its overly-expansive reading
of Knarston removes all limits on the kinds of provision [sic] that
can be waived by parties eager to engage in a line-item redrafting
of their agreements.229
F. Possible Consequences of the Wyler Summit Decision
The Wyler Summit decision may pose significant hazards for
entertainment attorneys in drafting contracts for their clients. The
majority's holding could open the door to instability in contract law
because it potentially allows the use of waiver as a tool to unilaterally
modify a contract and impose additional duties on the non-waiving party.230
Under the Wyler Summit precedent, material provisions in entertainment
agreements that were previously unassailable without a mutual agreement
to modify may now be subject to deletion through one party's waiver.
2 3'
For example, recording contracts commonly contain a provision
stating that artists must deliver each album required under the contract
within a certain period of time.232 Suppose an artist who is unhappy with
his or her record company records all the albums required under the
contract within a short span of time, and subsequently claims he or she has
225. Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 666 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 659-60; see also supra Part III.A.
227. Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 666 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
228. See id. at 667.
229. Id.
230. See generally Karp, supra note 3, at 12.
231. See generally id., supra note 3, at 12-13; Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 667 (Tashima, J.,
dissenting).
232. See DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE Music BUSINESS
120-22 (1997). The time period normally spans between six and eighteen months. See id. at
122.
2000]
58 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW RE VIEW [Vol. 20:33
fully performed under the contract and is thus free to sign with another
record company.233 If the company with which the artist was originally
signed protests, the artist could rely on Wyler Summit and argue that
because the provision inured solely to the artist's benefit, he or she had the
right to waive it.
However, such a timing provision actually benefits both the record
company and the artist. At a minimum, it helps to ensure that the artist will
remain under exclusive commitment to the company while it strives to
promote and sell the artist's recordings. If the situation in this hypothetical
were to occur, the company could be burdened with a surplus of
unmarketable albums2 34 and unrecoupable royalties and costs, 235 while the
new album that the artist recorded for his or her new record company
reaches the top of the record charts.
In this hypothetical, waiver of the timing provision would result in
imposing burdens on the company that were not part of the contract--such
as being forced to market the artist's albums without the artist's
participation. Under the waiver rules established prior to Wyler Summit,
this result alone would likely have led a court to prohibit any attempt by the
artist to waive the timing provision.236 However, under Wyler Summit, as
long as the artist alleged that the provision was inserted in the contract
solely for his or her benefit, he or she would at least survive a motion to
dismiss or a motion for summary judgment in a resulting suit. The Wyler
Summit decision renders the artist's offensive use of waiver and the issue of
whether the provision was actually intended to benefit both parties
irrelevant-at least at the pre-trial motion stage.
Wyler Summit could also have a detrimental impact on the motion
picture business. Suppose two lead actors in a film nearing the end of
production decided after seeing the rough cut of the movie thatcthey did not
want their names associated with the film.237  The actors could use the
Wyler Summit decision to justify waiving their respective rights to receive
credit.238 The use of the actors' names in marketing the movie benefits the
studio as well as the actors because advertising the stars of the film helps to
233. See id. at 122 (recounting that musical artist Frank Zappa arrived at his record
company one day with four albums, "said he was delivering all the remaining product required
under his deal, and thus was free to sign elsewhere"); see also Karp, supra note 3, at 13.
234. See PASSMAN, supra note 232, at 122 (stating that record companies have an interest in
avoiding the artist delivering more than one album at a time because the company "can't
reasonably market more than one album at a time").
235. See generally id.
236. See supra Part II.B.4.
237. See generally Karp, supra note 3, at 13.
238. See id.
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draw large audiences and increase the studio's box office receipts.
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Wyler Summit potentially allows
actors to escape this type of credit provision through offensive waiver.
Of course, whether Wyler Summit "will ... have [such] a corrosive
effect on the stability of contractual relations '239 will depend on how lower
courts interpret and apply the Wyler Summit holding. If the lower courts
read Wyler Summit narrowly, such that only a very specific set of facts will
be held to support the allegation that a contract term was inserted to benefit
only the waiving party, then Wyler Summit may have little impact on
contract stability.24° Conversely, if the courts loosely interpret the benefit
issue, then "no doubt, aggressive practitioners will use contractual waiver
as an offensive sword to cut, splice, and dice agreements for clients looking
for a better deal than they bargained for," 241 or use it to get out of a deal
with which their clients are dissatisfied.
However, even if lower courts do interpret the benefit issue narrowly,
the Wyler Summit decision may nonetheless have damaging effects on
contractual relations. Prior to Wyler Summit, an attempt to employ
offensive waiver would likely have been disposed of in the pre-trial stage.
Wyler Summit may now permit a party to survive at least a motion to
dismiss. Thus, even if the decision does not ultimately result in offensive
waiver claims succeeding at trial, it could impose significant legal costs on
parties opposing an invalid waiver claim.
In summary, the fact that the Wyler Summit decision makes any of the
above scenarios legally possible should rightfully give pause to
entertainment lawyers who endeavor to create binding agreements upon
which their clients can rely and to protect their clients from costly legal
battles over their contractual rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Wyler Summit Partnership v. Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. not only contradicts settled rules of general
contract interpretation, but also proves to be inconsistent with California
law regarding the use of contractual waiver. With its unprecedented grant
of broad latitude to a party wanting to unilaterally rewrite a fundamental
provision of a contract, the decision may have "opened a Pandora's box of
challenges to longstanding contractual arrangements. 242
239. Wyler Summit, 135 F.3d at 667 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
240. See Karp, supra note 3, at 13.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 12.
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Entertainment attorneys in California should be aware of the Wyler
Summit decision until it is clear how persuasive the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning will ultimately be to lower courts. Until that time, an overly
cautious approach to drafting contracts is advisable. Attorneys can attempt
to circumvent the possibility that a party to a contract will try to use the
waiver doctrine offensively by inserting a "no waiver" clause.243 Such a
clause might state: "The parties acknowledge and agree that each and
every term and condition set forth herein has been inserted into the
agreement for the mutual benefit of the parties." 2 " This type of language
may preclude a party from successfully invoking Wyler Summit to
unilaterally and offensively waive a contract provision, and thus help to
preserve the original intent of all parties and to protect the stability of the
contract.
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